Online learning for brokerage

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Outline

- 1 Brokerage
- 2 Contextual linear brokerage
- 3 Contextual Lipschitz brokerage
- 4 Full feedback

Brokerage problem

- lacksquare Consider successive pairs of trading agents entering a market at times $t=1,2,\ldots$
- \blacksquare At each time t, each agent gives a valuation to a good to be traded.
- Focus on the pairs of valuations $(V_t, W_t)_{t \in \mathbb{N}} \in [0, 1]^{\mathbb{N}}$, assumed to be iid.
- We take the role of the trading platform that suggests a trading price $P_t \in [0,1]$ at each time t.
- The gain from trade is

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{gft}(P_t, V_t, W_t) = &\underbrace{\mathbf{I}\left\{\min(V_t, W_t) \leq P_t \leq \max(V_t, W_t)\right\}}_{\text{wheever a trade occurs}} \left(\underbrace{\left[\max(V_t, W_t) - P_t\right]}_{\text{profit of the buyer}} + \underbrace{\left[P_t - \min(V_t, W_t)\right]}_{\text{profit of the seller}}\right) \\ = &\mathbf{I}\left\{\min(V_t, W_t) \leq P_t \leq \max(V_t, W_t)\right\} \left(\max(V_t, W_t) - \min(V_t, W_t)\right). \end{split}$$

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gain from trade

Online learning for brokerage

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missed trade

Brokerage problem as an online learning problem

Online protocol with two-bit feedback

For t = 1, 2, ...,

- **11** The learner chooses a price $P_t \in [0, 1]$.
- 2 Two traders arrive with valuations V_t , W_t and the learner earns the (hidden) gain from trade

$$gft(P_t, V_t, W_t).$$

The learner observes the two-bit feedback

$$\mathbf{I}\{P_t \leq V_t\}, \mathbf{I}\{P_t \leq W_t\}.$$

Cumulated regret from time t = 1, ..., T

$$R_T \coloneqq \sup_{oldsymbol{
ho} \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T \operatorname{gft}(oldsymbol{
ho}, V_t, W_t)
ight] - \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T \operatorname{gft}(P_t, V_t, W_t)
ight].$$

Some related problems

Dynamic pricing: the learner (seller) posts a price $P_t \in [0,1]$ are receives profit

$$P_t \mathbf{I} \{ P_t \leq Y_t \}$$

for a random buyer valuation $Y_t \in [0,1]$ [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003, Tullii et al., 2024].

■ Bilateral trade: the learner (the platform) posts a price $P_t \in [0,1]$ are receives profit

$$I\{S_t \leq P_t \leq B_t\} (B_t - S_t)$$

for random buyer (B_t) and seller (S_t) valuations in [0,1] [Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2024]. \Longrightarrow Same as our setting but with pre-determined buyer and seller.

Assumption: independent valuations, identical distribution

Assumption

The valuations V_t , W_t are independent with identical distribution.

Identical distribution

- Can be interpreted as a symmetry.
- Removing it makes the problem a variation of bilateral trade [Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2024].

Independence

- Open question: removing this assumption leads to settings of linear regret, similarly as in bilateral trade?
- Two-bit feedback allows to recover the marginal distributions of V_t and W_t but not the joint.

Explicit expressions of the gain from trade

- Write ν for the distribution of V_t and W_t .
- Write $\bar{\nu} = \mathbb{E}[V_t] = \mathbb{E}[W_t]$.

Define, for $p \in [0, 1]$,

$$\widetilde{\rho}(\nu)(p) := \int_0^p \left(\nu[0,\lambda] + \nu[0,\lambda)\right) d\lambda + \left(\nu[0,p] + \nu[0,p)\right)(\overline{\nu} - p),$$

$$\rho(\nu)(p) := \widetilde{\rho}(\nu)(p) + \nu\{p\} \left(\int_0^p \nu[0,\lambda] d\lambda + \int_p^1 \nu[\lambda,1] d\lambda\right).$$

Explicit expressions [Bolić et al., 2024].

■ In general, we have

$$\mathbb{E}\big[\mathrm{gft}(p,V_t,W_t)\big]=\rho(\nu)(p).$$

• If ν has a density bounded by $M < \infty$, we have

$$0 \leq \rho(\nu)(\bar{\nu}) - \rho(\nu)(p) \leq M |\bar{\nu} - p|^2.$$

Reduces to estimating the mean for continuous distributions. François Bachoc

Algorithm for continuous distributions

To estimate the mean:

$$\mathbb{E}\big[V_t\big] = \int_0^1 \mathbb{P}\big[x \le V_t\big] \,\mathrm{d}x.$$

Algorithm Explore then Commit

```
1: Input: Exploration time T_0 \in \mathbb{N}
```

2: **for**
$$t = 1, 2, ..., T_0$$
 do (explore)

3: Post
$$P_t \leftarrow \frac{t}{T_0}$$

Receive feedback
$$I\{P_t \leq V_t\}$$
 and $I\{P_t \leq W_t\}$

5: end for

6: **for**
$$t = T_0 + 1, T_0 + 2, \dots$$
 do (commit)

7: Post
$$P_t \leftarrow \frac{1}{2T_0} \sum_{s=1}^{T_0} \left(\mathbf{I}\{P_s \leq V_s\} + \mathbf{I}\{P_s \leq W_s\} \right)$$

8: end for

Bounds for continuous distributions

From [Bolić et al., 2024].

Upper bound

With Explore then Commit algorithm, tuning the parameter $T_0 \coloneqq \lceil \sqrt{MT} \rceil$ yields

$$R_T \leq 2.5 + 2\sqrt{MT}$$
.

Lower bound

The worst-case regret of any algorithm satisfies, for $T \ge \operatorname{constant} M^3$,

$$\sup_{\nu \text{ has density bounded by } M} R_T^\nu \geq \mathrm{constant} \sqrt{MT} \;,$$


where R_T^{ν} is the regret at time T under $V_t, W_t \sim \nu$.

Complete tight dependence in M remains open.


Ideas on the lower bound

From [Bolić et al., 2024] : two close hard instances with $\pm \epsilon$.

Two possible densities



Two possible gains from trade



- Only way to differentiate the two densities: post price in suboptimal region $\left[\frac{1}{7}, \frac{2}{7}\right]$.
- Take $\epsilon = (MT)^{-\frac{1}{4}}$.

Impossibility result for general distributions

From [Bolić et al., 2024].


Linear regret for general distributions

For any time horizon T, the worst-case regret of any algorithm satisfies

$$\sup_{\nu} R_T^{\nu} \geq \frac{T}{9} \; ,$$

where the sup is over all distributions ν .

Proof idea: needle in a haystack





(a) Distribution of V_t, W_t (3 weighted Diracs) (b) Expected gain from trade

1 Brokerage

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Contextual linear setting

In [Bachoc et al., 2025a].

Online protocol with contexts

For t = 1, 2, ...,

- **1** A context $c_t \in [0,1]^d$ is revealed.
 - Deterministic adversarial sequence of contexts, unknown in advance.
- **2** The learner chooses a price $P_t \in [0,1]$.
- \blacksquare Hidden valuations V_t , W_t and the learner earns the (hidden) gain from trade.
- The learner observes the two-bit feedback.

Linearity assumpion

The pairs $(V_t, W_t)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ are no longer iid.

For all $t \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\mathbb{E}\big[V_t\big](=\mathbb{E}\big[W_t\big])=c_t^\top\phi$$

for a fixed unknown $\phi \in [0, 1]^d$.

Contextual linear setting: regret

Cumulated regret from time t = 1, ..., T

$$R_T \coloneqq \sup_{oldsymbol{
ho}^\star: [0,1]^d
ightarrow [0,1]} \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^T \operatorname{gft}(oldsymbol{
ho}^\star(c_t), V_t, W_t)
ight] - \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^T \operatorname{gft}(P_t, V_t, W_t)
ight].$$

Algorithm


- \blacksquare For densities upper bounded by M.
- Write $||x||_Q^2 = x^\top Qx$ for a vector x and a matrix Q.

Algorithm (exploit or learn ridge regresion)

```
1: Post P_1 \sim \mathcal{U}([0,1]), and observe D_1 := I\{P_1 < V_1\}
 2: Let x_1 := [c_1], let Y_1 := [D_1] and compute \hat{\phi}_1 := (x_1 x_1^\top + d^{-1} I_d)^{-1} x_1 Y_1^\top (ridge regression)
 3: for time t = 2, 3, ... do
            Observe context c_t and define b_t \coloneqq \mathbf{I} \left\{ \left\| \sqrt{2}c_t \right\|_{\left(x_{t-1}x_{t-1}^\top + d^{-1}\mathbf{I}_d\right)^{-1}}^2 > \sqrt{\frac{2d \log(1 + 2d(T-1))}{MT}} \right\}
           if b_t = 1 then (explore - learn ridge regression)
 5.
                  Post P_t \sim \mathcal{U}([0,1]), and observe D_t := \mathbf{I}\{P_t \leq V_t\}
 6.
                 Let x_t := [x_{t-1} \mid c_t], Y_t := [Y_{t-1} \mid D_t] \text{ and } \hat{\phi}_t := (x_t x_t^\top + \mathbf{I}_d)^{-1} x_t Y_t^\top
 7:
           else (exploit)
 8.
                 post P_t := c_t^\top \hat{\phi}_{t-1} and let x_t := x_{t-1}, Y_t := Y_{t-1}, and \hat{\phi}_t := \hat{\phi}_{t-1}
 9:
            end if
10.
11: end for
```

Illustration of the algorithm

For d=2:



Upper bound

Upper bound

With the previous algorithm (exploit or feed ridge regresion) we have, when the density of V_t and W_t is bounded by M,

$$R_T \leq \text{constant}\sqrt{MdT\log(T)}$$
.

A useful tool: Elliptical potential lemma (taken from [Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2020])

LEMMA 19.4. Let $V_0 \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$ be positive definite and $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in \mathbb{R}^d$ be a sequence of vectors with $||a_t||_2 \leq L < \infty$ for all $t \in [n]$, $V_t = V_0 + \sum_{s \leq t} a_s a_s^\top$. Then,

$$\sum_{t=1}^n \left(1 \wedge \|a_t\|_{V_{t-1}^{-1}}^2\right) \leq 2\log\left(\frac{\det V_n}{\det V_0}\right) \leq 2d\log\left(\frac{\operatorname{trace} V_0 + nL^2}{d\det(V_0)^{1/d}}\right)\,.$$

Lower bound

Lower bound

For any algorithm, for $T \ge \max(4, \operatorname{constant} dM^3, 2d)$,

$$\sup_{\substack{\text{settings} \\ \text{contexts}}} R_T^{\text{settings,contexts}} \geq \text{constant} \sqrt{\textit{MdT}},$$

where the sup is over all settings and context sequence where

- linearity assumption holds,
- $lue{V}_t$ and W_t are independent and identically distributed, with density bounded by M.

Open question: ranges of c_t and ϕ

- Currently, we assume $\phi \in [0,1]^d$ and $c_t^\top \phi \in [0,1]$.
- \blacksquare Allows to have tight lower and upper bounds in d, T.
- The lower bound uses $(\phi_1, \ldots, \phi_d) = (\frac{1}{2} \pm o(1), \ldots, \frac{1}{2} \pm o(1))$ and c_1, \ldots, c_t unit vectors.
- Open question: tighter bounds for ϕ sparse or $\|\phi\| \ll \sqrt{d}$.

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Contextual Lipschitz setting

- In [Bachoc et al., 2025b].
- Same online protocol with contexts as in the linear case.

Lipschitz assumpion

For all $t,t'\in\mathbb{N}$, $\left|\mathbb{E}\big[V_t\big]-\mathbb{E}\big[V_{t'}\big]\right|\leq \left\|c_t-c_{t'}\right\|_{\infty}.$ (Recall that $\mathbb{E}\big[V_t\big]=\mathbb{E}\big[W_t\big],\ \forall t.$)

 Same definition of cumulated regret as in the linear case (compete against best deterministic function of contexts).


Algorithm

Algorithm Exploit, Explore, and Bisect (main ideas)

- Maintains a set of active cells.
 - Of the form $\prod_{k=1}^d \left(\frac{i_k-1}{2^j}, \frac{i_k}{2^j}\right], i_1, \ldots, i_k \in \{1, \ldots, 2^j\}$ with depth j.
 - Starting with just the cell $(0,1]^d$.
 - Maintaining at all time a partition of $(0,1]^d$.
- \blacksquare For a cell of depth j, consider the contexts that belong to it, at times when it is active:
 - **Exploit**: for the 2^{4j} first contexts, post a local average of two-bit-feedbacks from previously generated uniform prices (in previous exploration times).
 - **2** Explore: for the 2^{2j} next contexts, generate a uniform price.
 - \blacksquare Bisect: then make the cell inactive and replace it by its 2^d children by bisection.

Illustration of the algorithm

For d = 2: life of an active cell at times $t_1 < t_2 < t_3 < t_4$.



Upper bound

Upper bound

With the previous algorithm (Exploit, Explore, and Bisect) we have, when the density of V_t and W_t is bounded by M.

$$R_T \leq \text{constant}_d M T^{\frac{d+2}{d+4}}$$
.

Open question: dependence on an unknown intrinsic context dimension $d_0 < d$?

Lower bound

Lower bound

For any algorithm, for $M \geq 2$,

$$\sup_{\substack{\text{settings}, \text{contexts} \\ \text{contexts}}} R_T^{\text{settings}, \text{contexts}} \ge \operatorname{constant}_d T^{\frac{d+2}{d+4}}$$

where the sup is over all settings and contexts where

- Lipschitz assumption holds,
- $lue{V}_t$ and W_t are independent and identically distributed, with density bounded by M.

Tight dependence in M remains open.

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Full feedback

Online protocol with full feedback

For t = 1, 2, ...,

- **1** The learner chooses a price $P_t \in [0,1]$.
- 2 Two traders arrive with valuations V_t , W_t that are observed by the learner.
- The learner earns the (observed) gain from trade

$$gft(P_t, V_t, W_t)$$
.

- The learner does not need to "select" the information it receives.
- Less realistic modeling assumption.
- Motivation:
 - different theoretical behavior,
 - quantify loss of performance due to loss of information in two-bit feedback.

For bounded density

From [Bolić et al., 2024].

Algorithm (follow the mean)

- 1: Post $P_1 \leftarrow \frac{1}{2}$
- 2: Receive feedback V_1 , W_1
- 3: **for** $t = 2, 3, \dots$ **do**
- 4: Post $P_t \leftarrow \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} V_s + W_s}{2(t-1)}$
- 5: Receive feedback V_t , W_t
- 6: end for

Upper bound

With this algorithm, we have, when the density of V_t and W_t is bounded by M, for $T \geq 2$,

$$R_{\mathcal{T}} \leq rac{1}{2} + rac{\mathcal{M}}{4}ig(1 + \log(\mathcal{T} - 1)ig).$$

For bounded density

From [Bolić et al., 2024].

Lower bound

The worst-case regret of any algorithm satisfies, for $T \ge \operatorname{constant} M^8$,

$$\sup_{\nu \text{ has density bounded by } M} R_T^{\nu} \geq \mathrm{constant} M \log(T),$$

where R_T^{ν} is the regret at time T under $V_t, W_t \sim \nu$.

Complete tight dependence in M remains open.

Without bounded density

From [Bolić et al., 2024]. Recall

$$\mathbb{E}\big[\mathrm{gft}(p,V_t,W_t)\big]=\rho(\nu)(p).$$

Algorithm (follow the ρ)

- 1: Post $P_1 \leftarrow \frac{1}{2}$
- 2: Receive feedback V_1, W_1
- 3: **for** t = 2, 3, ... **do**
- 4: Let $\hat{\nu}_t \leftarrow \frac{1}{2(t-1)} \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \delta_{V_s} + \delta_{W_s}$
- 5: Post $P_t \in \operatorname{argmax}_{p \in [0,1]} \rho(\hat{\nu}_t)(p)$
- 6: Receive feedback V_t, W_t
- 7: end for

Without bounded density

From [Bolić et al., 2024].

Upper bound

With the previous algorithm (follow the ρ), we have

$$R_T \leq 1/2 + 4\big(3\sqrt{\pi} + \sqrt{2}\big)\sqrt{T-1}.$$

Lower bound

The worst-case regret of any algorithm satisfies

$$\sup_{\text{distribution }\nu} R_T^{\nu} \geq \text{constant}\sqrt{T},$$

where R_T^{ν} is the regret at time T under V_t , $W_t \sim \nu$.

A first best of both worlds

From [Bolić et al., 2024].

Algorithm (follow the mean then ρ)

```
1: for t=1,2,\ldots do
2: Post P_t according to follow the mean
3: if |\{V_1,\ldots,V_t,W_1,\ldots,W_t\}| < 2t (a repetition) then
4: \tau \leftarrow t
5: break
6: end if
7: end for
8: Run follow the \rho up to time \tau without posting prices
9: for t=\tau+1,\tau+2,\ldots do
10: Post P_t according to follow the \rho
11: end for
```

Upper bounds

- If V_t , W_t have density bounded by M: $R_T \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{M}{4}(1 + \log(T 1))$.
- Otherwise $R_T < 7.5 + 6(2\sqrt{\pi} + \sqrt{2})\sqrt{T-1}$.

A second best of both worlds

From [Bachoc et al., 2024].

Upper bound: follow the ρ under density bounded by M

We have

$$R_T \leq \operatorname{constant} \left((\log T)^2 + M^2 \log T + M^4 \right).$$

Some proof ideas:

• If $\hat{\nu}_t = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=1}^t \delta_{x_s}$ from a sample x_1, \dots, x_t , with

$$0 \le x_1 < \dots < x_k < \frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=1}^t x_s < x_{k+1} < \dots < x_t \le 1$$

then $\underset{p \in [0,1]}{\operatorname{argmax}} \rho(\hat{\nu}_t)(p) \in \{x_k, x_{k+1}\}.$

■ As a consequence, with F the CDF of ν , $\bar{\nu}$ the mean of ν ,

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\left(F(\bar{\nu}) - F(P_t) \right) \cdot \left(\bar{\nu} - P_t \right) \right] \leq \frac{408 \log(2t)}{t} + \frac{2 + 33M + 32M^2}{t} + 4 \exp\left(\frac{-t}{2048M^4} \right).$$

Conclusion


	No independence	Independence No bounded density	Both
To bit foodbook (one contextual)	T2		
Two-bit feedback (non-contextual)	1 !	1	\sqrt{I}
Full feedback (non-contextual)		\sqrt{T}	$\log(T)$
Two-bit feedback (linear-contextual)	<i>T</i> ?	T	\sqrt{dT}
Two-bit feedback (Lipschitz-contextual)	T?	T	$\mathcal{T}^{\frac{d+2}{d+4}}$

Table: Rates according to assumptions on V_t , W_t and feedback.

- Non-contextual setting: [Bolić et al., 2024].
- Non-contextual setting with additional results (follow the ρ in full-feedback for bounded densities) [Bachoc et al., 2024].
- Contextual linear: [Bachoc et al., 2025a].
- Contextual Lipschitz [Bachoc et al., 2025b].

Open questions:

- tighter dependence with respect to some parameters,
- sparsity, low ambient dimension.



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